Regardless of growing challenges to ASEAN centrality, the idea nonetheless has demonstrable results on regional dynamics by shaping how actors body their pursuits and engagement methods. Nevertheless, to reduce the rhetoric-reality hole, or in different phrases, the disconnect between formal endorsements of ASEAN centrality (purposeful narratives) and its sensible undermining (undermining of ASEAN’s precise central function), ASEAN must try to adapt. Adaptation would enhance its relevance and company amid intensifying nice energy competitors and complicated transnational threats. The primary part of this text establishes the importance of ASEAN’s central function. Within the second half, I consider the strategic deployment of the ASEAN centrality narrative by numerous actors. Within the last part, I spotlight areas the place ASEAN ought to focus and adapt to keep up substantive centrality in regional affairs.
Significance and Effectiveness of ASEAN Centrality
The idea of centrality was formally institutionalized within the ASEAN Constitution of 2007, which explicitly mandated sustaining “the centrality and proactive function of ASEAN as the first driving drive in its relations and cooperation with its exterior companions” (ASEAN 2007, 4). This codification mirrored ASEAN’s rising consciousness of the necessity to articulate its function amid the quickly evolving regional structure. From a theoretical standpoint, ASEAN centrality is known by way of a number of lenses. Tan (2017) presents 5 interrelated conceptions: regional chief, regional convener, regional hub/node, regional driver of progress, and regional comfort. Different students analyzed conceptions comparable to chief, convener, comfort, necessity (Mueller 2019) and scope setter (Valockova 2021).
ASEAN centrality has yielded a number of notable successes. ASEAN’s centrality is manifested in its function because the architect of regional safety group establishments in Asia. ASEAN has established a dense community of institutional preparations that collectively represent essentially the most complete regional structure within the Indo-Pacific. This institutional ecosystem has supplied platforms for dialogue on delicate safety points, financial integration, and socio-cultural cooperation (Caballero-Anthony 2014). From the mid-Nineties by way of the early 2010s, ASEAN expanded its household of establishments to incorporate the ASEAN Regional Discussion board (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Protection Ministers’ Assembly Plus (ADMM+), and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Discussion board (EAMF).
This enlargement positioned ASEAN as the first platform for macro-regional dialogue, with the Affiliation serving because the “steering wheel” of macro-regional processes (Koldunova 2025). ASEAN’s institutional structure is characterised by what has been termed a “multiplex regional structure,” which maintains and develops a community of various groupings slightly than permitting a single discussion board to regulate the area’s political, financial, and safety processes (SIIA 2015). This method softens questions of inclusion and exclusion, diffuses competitors for affect amongst totally different powers, and emphasizes community-building based mostly on cooperation norms slightly than energy calculations (SIIA 2015).
ASEAN centrality has enabled the group to play an important balancing function in managing relations between main powers, significantly the US and China. As the one impartial dealer with the convening energy and credibility to arrange multilateral dialogues, ASEAN has been capable of mitigate the distrust among the many key powers of the area – China, the US, Japan, and India (Acharya 2023). By stopping any exterior energy from controlling the regional agenda, ASEAN has been capable of create a conducive setting for balanced and inclusive dialogue, enhancing stability and cooperation within the area.
ASEAN has performed a big function in shaping regional norms and socializing exterior powers into accepting these norms. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), initially designed for Southeast Asian states, has develop into a key normative framework for the broader area, with main powers together with China, the US, and Russia turning into signatories. By its management in regional boards, ASEAN has promoted norms comparable to non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and peaceable decision of disputes. These norms have helped facilitate a extra predictable and steady regional setting, regardless of the absence of binding safety preparations.
The intensifying strategic competitors between the US and China presents maybe essentially the most important exterior problem to ASEAN centrality. As each powers advance competing visions for regional order – by way of initiatives comparable to China’s Belt and Street Initiative (BRI) and the US Indo-Pacific Technique – ASEAN dangers being marginalized or divided alongside nice energy fault traces (Laksmana 2020). China’s financial gravity and geographic proximity give it substantial affect inside Southeast Asia. On the similar time, many ASEAN states keep safety ties with the US and search its continued regional presence as a counterbalance to Chinese language energy. This creates a fragile balancing act for ASEAN, which should navigate between these competing pursuits whereas sustaining its autonomous function (Tan 2021).
Inside challenges inside ASEAN additional complicate the group’s capability to keep up centrality. The variety of political techniques, improvement ranges, and strategic orientations amongst member states makes cohesive motion troublesome, significantly on delicate points the place exterior powers have important stakes (Weatherbee 2019). The disaster in Myanmar following the February 2021 army coup has highlighted ASEAN’s restricted capability to deal with inside challenges successfully. Regardless of the event of the 5-Level Consensus, ASEAN has struggled to affect the scenario meaningfully, elevating questions on its credibility as a regional actor (Jones 2023). Institutional capability constraints additionally undermine ASEAN centrality. The ASEAN Secretariat stays comparatively small and under-resourced in comparison with different worldwide organizations (CIL 2015), limiting its capability to drive bold regional initiatives.
The group’s consensus-based decision-making has typically resulted in lowest-common-denominator outcomes, significantly on contentious points such because the South China Sea disputes. ASEAN’s lack of ability to type a unified place on China’s assertive actions has highlighted the constraints of centrality when member states have divergent strategic pursuits (Limsiritong, Springall and Rojanawanichkij 2019). Furthermore, ASEAN-led boards have been criticized for being “discuss outlets” that produce declarations however lack enforcement mechanisms. The hole between normative aspirations and sensible outcomes has thus raised questions in regards to the substantive impression of ASEAN centrality past procedural affect (Jones and Smith 2007).
The emergence of minilateral groupings and different frameworks represents one other important problem to ASEAN centrality. Preparations such because the Quadrilateral Safety Dialogue (Quad) between the US, Japan, India, and Australia, and the AUKUS safety partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US may probably bypass ASEAN-led mechanisms in addressing regional safety challenges (Chong 2024). These developments mirror a rising “dissatisfaction with ASEAN centrality” amongst some exterior powers (Nagy 2023) and notion that ASEAN-led processes could also be inadequate to deal with regional challenges. Moreover, ASEAN members’ views on these new groupings differ, creating potential inside divisions that would undermine ASEAN centrality and “be exploited by exterior powers” (Koga 2022, 12).
Strategic Deployment of the ASEAN Centrality Narrative by Completely different Actors
So as to add to the evaluation of and debate about ASEAN centrality, I suggest to judge ASEAN centrality by way of the lens of strategic narratives. Strategic narratives signify a strong software in worldwide relations, functioning as constructed accounts that form perceptions and affect conduct. As Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2013, 5) clarify, strategic narratives draw collectively “essentially the most salient of worldwide relations ideas, together with the hyperlinks between energy and concepts; worldwide and home; and state and non-state actors”. These narratives should not merely descriptive however performative—they actively work to assemble a specific understanding of actuality that serves particular pursuits. Subsequently, it’s a helpful framework to look at the rhetoric-reality hole associated to ASEAN centrality.
Within the case of ASEAN, centrality has been used as a strategic narrative software serving a number of capabilities comparable to id building and legitimation. This instrumental and utilitarian facet of ASEAN centrality implies that the idea can serve specific pursuits to advance particular agendas, leading to both selling or undermining ASEAN centrality.
ASEAN collectively deploys the centrality narrative as a method of self-preservation and to keep up relevance in a area dominated by bigger powers. As Koldunova (2025)contends, “ASEAN centrality is attention-grabbing and mandatory, to begin with, for ASEAN itself as a situation for self-preservation as an impartial centre of energy amid quickly altering worldwide configurations.” The narrative helps ASEAN place itself because the “core of regionalism in East Asia and the Asia Pacific” (Severino 2007, 406) regardless of being composed of center and smaller states. ASEAN formally articulates centrality by way of formal paperwork just like the ASEAN Constitution. This deployment serves to keep up ASEAN’s “legitimacy and credibility, which additional enhances its capability to play a number one function” (SIIA 2015, 2) in regional affairs.
Particular person ASEAN members deploy the centrality narrative in a different way based mostly on their nationwide pursuits and hedging preferences. Some members prioritize alignment with China, whereas others lean towards the US, creating inside friction that undermines the unity mandatory for efficient centrality (Das 2024). The Philippines, for instance, has sought “nearer defence cooperation with the US and different exterior powers to defend its reliable maritime claims in opposition to Chinese language encroachment” regardless of “quiet discontentment and criticism from some ASEAN members” (Yaacob 2024). This demonstrates how particular person member states could strategically bypass the centrality narrative when it fails to serve their safety pursuits.
One other working example is the Myanmar junta who has fully failed to stick to its rhetoric relating to the 5-Level Consensus. Regardless of Senior Common Min Aung Hlaing formally agreeing to the 5-Level Consensus in April 2021, the junta has proven no real dedication to implementing any of its 5 factors (Wahyuningrum 2025). In consequence, as Singapore’s Protection Minister Ng Eng Hen famous, “Myanmar’s behaviour dangers undermining the ASEAN Centrality that we’ve got painstakingly constructed over the previous 20 years” (Channel Information Asia 2024).
Exterior powers generally use rhetorical help for ASEAN centrality as a deflection technique. The working example is when China and the US publicly endorse ASEAN centrality whereas concurrently pursuing actions that probably undermine it. Each international locations have reiterated their help for ASEAN centrality and established complete strategic partnerships with ASEAN in recent times. Nevertheless, their aggressive strategic investments within the area typically create “extra challenges than alternatives for ASEAN” (Zhang 2023). This sample aligns with what Das (2024, 57) describes as a paradox the place the shifting dynamics compel nations to collaborate, however this “collective effort inadvertently facilitates the pursuits of hegemonic powers in advancing their very own agendas.” Exterior powers thus generally successfully use ASEAN centrality as a rhetorical protect whereas pursuing insurance policies that will undermine regional cohesion.
China deploys the ASEAN centrality narrative whereas concurrently sidelining it by way of bilateral approaches when navigating contentious issues, significantly these involving territorial claims with ASEAN member states. This undermines ASEAN centrality as a result of such “manipulation of divisions among the many ASEAN member states additional weakens the solidarity essential to successfully counter China’s actions” (Das 2024, 57).
Furthermore, whereas publicly supporting the Code of Conduct negotiations, China has traditionally used delaying ways: “Beijing’s technique had been to frustrate ASEAN by doing nothing, besides discuss and speak about a ‘declaration’ of conduct” (Kassim, 2019). Moreover, China’s actions within the South China Sea immediately contradicted its rhetoric. All through 2024, China “markedly stepped up its intimidation, harassment, and coercion in opposition to Philippine Navy, Philippine Coast Guard, and civilian vessels” (Thayer 2025). This means rhetorical help with out substantive dedication.
The USA have persistently acknowledged and supported ASEAN centrality in numerous official paperwork and statements whereas creating different frameworks that probably undermine it, which contradicts its public help for ASEAN centrality. The Quad and AUKUS function independently of ASEAN management and the “absence of Southeast Asian illustration within the US-led Quad conferences raises questions on ASEAN’s standing in discussions which can be pivotal to the area’s future, which is a notable paradox for the thought of ASEAN centrality” (Das 2024, 57). Subsequently, Quad and AUKUS have “fuelled debates in regards to the viability of ASEAN’s mannequin of inclusive cooperation” (Teo 2023). They introduce aggressive dynamics in regional institution-building and probably dilute ASEAN’s convening energy as a result of “though the Quad members explicitly expressed their robust help for ASEAN centrality, there has but to be any clear coverage outlined on the distribution of institutional roles between them” (Koga 2022, 12).
For ASEAN, the centrality narrative legitimizes its management function regardless of restricted materials capabilities. For exterior powers, it legitimizes their regional engagement by presenting it as supportive of regional norms. Nevertheless, it may also be bypassed or used to deflect criticism of actions and mechanisms that may undermine regional unity and ASEAN’s function. Subsequently, ASEAN centrality is usually a double-edged sword.
Past the Narrative: Sustaining the Substance of ASEAN Centrality
Students and analysts stay divided on the query of ASEAN centrality. Whereas some are extra skeptical (see for instance, Beeson (2022)), others spotlight the worth in ASEAN centrality (see for instance, Koldunova (2025)). I argue that in the long run to mitigate the chance of an growing hole between rhetoric (centrality as a purposeful narrative) and actuality (substantive centrality), ASEAN ought to search adaptation in three areas.
To maintain its centrality, ASEAN ought to pursue institutional reforms that improve its responsiveness, effectiveness, and cohesion. This might embody strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat’s assets and mandate, creating extra versatile decision-making mechanisms for pressing points, and enhancing implementation monitoring for ASEAN agreements (SIIA 2015; Cogan 2022). Enhanced coordination amongst ASEAN-led mechanisms may cut back fragmentation and duplication whereas creating clearer division of labor amongst these boards (Sundram 2025). This could strengthen ASEAN’s capability to handle complicated regional challenges by way of complementary institutional processes.
ASEAN centrality relies upon basically on the group’s capability to keep up strategic autonomy amid nice energy competitors. This requires a nuanced method to exterior relations that resists unique alignment with any single energy whereas partaking constructively with all (Anwar 2019). Specifically, by way of its ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) adopted in 2019, ASEAN responded strategically to competing regional visions. By articulating its personal conception of regional order based mostly on inclusivity, transparency, and ASEAN centrality, ASEAN has tried to reclaim narrative management (Kliem 2019) and place itself as an impartial actor slightly than a passive topic of nice energy competitors. ASEAN ought to proceed to develop this method by figuring out particular areas the place it might train management based mostly on its comparative benefits – comparable to selling inclusive financial structure, maritime cooperation, and non-traditional safety points.
Relatively than viewing minilateral preparations as inherent threats to ASEAN centrality, ASEAN may undertake a extra proactive method to engagement with these frameworks. This might embody creating formal session mechanisms with groupings just like the Quad, proposing joint initiatives on shared issues, and exploring methods to attach minilateral preparations with ASEAN-led processes (Khoe 2023; Chong 2024). As well as, ASEAN may develop extra concrete implementation mechanisms for the AOIP (Hussain 2019) that display how exterior initiatives can align with ASEAN-centered regional structure.
Enhancing ASEAN centrality, nonetheless, is a frightening activity as a result of it includes overcoming implementation limitations. First, institutional reforms encounter resistance as a consequence of sovereignty issues. Proposals to strengthen the ASEAN Secretariat and develop extra versatile decision-making mechanisms confront the deeply entrenched “ASEAN Means” of consensus-based diplomacy. Member states would want to “get rid of the preeminence of sovereignty” (Cogan 2022) to maneuver towards better coherence—a troublesome concession given the various political techniques and historic experiences inside ASEAN. Second, strengthening strategic autonomy is sophisticated by financial dependencies. With China being ASEAN’s largest buying and selling accomplice for 15 consecutive years (Bernama-VNA 2024), many member states face financial pressures that constrain their strategic choices. Addressing these financial vulnerabilities would require enhancing different partnerships and decreasing dependencies—a long-term course of necessitating sustained political will. Lastly, partaking with minilateral preparations requires overcoming inside divisions about their strategic implications. The Quad and AUKUS have triggered division amongst member states on whether or not these frameworks complement or undermine ASEAN centrality. Growing a unified method to those preparations would require reconciling divergent safety views amongst members who variously prioritize alignment with China or the US.
Conclusion
ASEAN centrality has been a big achievement sustaining peace within the area. By establishing itself because the hub of regional multilateralism and the first convener of inclusive dialogue, ASEAN has exercised an affect disproportionate to the person capabilities of its member states. On the similar time, ASEAN centrality has develop into a strong narrative software wielded by numerous actors for strategic functions. ASEAN member states and main powers use it to border their pursuits and engagement methods. Subsequently, within the present geopolitical panorama, ASEAN centrality is “neither predetermined nor assured,” (Koldunova 2025) requiring constant efforts to protect its relevance amid shifting energy dynamics.
We have now seen that ASEAN centrality generally capabilities as a strategic narrative that may be deployed by numerous actors for their very own functions, creating a big hole between rhetoric and actuality. To reduce the rhetoric-reality hole and enhance the credibility of ASEAN centrality, ASEAN ought to adapt whereas preserving the core rules which have underpinned its method to regional engagement. The trail ahead requires balancing continuity and alter – ASEAN ought to keep its elementary dedication to its values whereas creating extra strong institutional mechanisms, enhancing its strategic autonomy, and interesting proactively with exterior initiatives. As such, formal endorsements of ASEAN centrality (purposeful narratives) usually tend to be accompanied by sensible implementation and substantive dedication. Then, as ASEAN Sec-Gen, Dr Kao Kim put it, ASEAN will “develop into an actual centripetal drive.” (LKYSPP 2024).
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