On February 23, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared: “We demand the entire demilitarization of southern Syria from the forces of the brand new regime. Likewise, we is not going to tolerate any risk to the Druze group in southern Syria”. On this regard, on March 1, 2025, there have been minor sectarian clashes between Sunni and Druze locals within the Syrian Druze city of Jarmana, positioned about eight kilometers south of Damascus, and Netanyahu and his Protection Minister, Yisrael Katz, issued a public risk to the brand new Syrian, Al-Sharaa regime that Israel could be ready to intervene in Syrian inner affairs within the occasion of an assault in opposition to Druze within the city of Jarmana. This text analyzes the motives behind Netanyahu’s assertion and its repercussions on the destiny of the Druze minority, and whether or not Israel’s involvement in Syrian inner affairs has a direct impact on the lethal massacres in opposition to members of the Druze minority in late April and mid-July in Syria.
After the autumn of the Assad regime in early December 2024, however, the brand new regime led by Ahmed al-Sharaa expressed its willingness to have interaction in a reconciliation course of between all Syrian ethnic teams so as to kind a united Syria. The willingness to grow to be a part of this new nationwide reconciliation undertaking was pushed by the overall fervor that culminated in a broad nationwide sentiment and euphoria of constructing a brand new and democratic Syria, free from dictatorship. This fervor didn’t escape the Druze group, within the hope of opening a brand new web page within the nation’s historical past after the departure of the Assad regime. Certainly, a number of Druze delegations from Lebanon and Swaida (the capital of the Druze province) visited and congratulated the brand new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, whereas the mixing of minorities, together with the Druze minority, was, at the least formally, on the agenda of the brand new regime.
Moreover, Druze fighters from Swaida even launched an assault in opposition to the forces of the Assad regime on December 8, thereby participated in overthrowing the previous regime and had been seen as a part of the forces that took half in constructing the brand new Syria. Equally, the alternative of the previous regime raised hopes among the many Druze, in addition to among the many majority of the Syrian inhabitants, that the occasions of December 8, 2024, would herald a brand new and wonderful period that may deliver safety and prosperity, provided that the Syrian inhabitants beneath the Assad regime was not solely missing in safety, but in addition primary subsistence wants, similar to electrical energy, gasoline, and meals.
Certainly, on the finish of December 2024, the al-Sharaa regime despatched troops to Swaida to broaden his rule over the district, however the Druze militia “Rejal al-Karama” or “Males of Honor” prevented them from getting into the province, not as a result of the province didn’t acknowledge the legitimacy of the brand new regime, however as a result of the militia leaders needed an settlement that may legalize the mixing of their militia into the formal forces of the brand new regime, and that the safety forces within the Swaida district could be composed of individuals from the province along with a small share of the brand new regime’s forces. Consequently, the forces Al-Sharaa returned to Damascus on their heels and with none clashes.
Therefore, Netanyahu’s assertion from February is controversial, particularly since there was no public attraction from any senior determine within the Syrian Druze group presently to Israel to offer any help for the group in opposition to the Sharaa regime and the Druze even hoped to combine into the ranks of latest regime. Lastly, how did Israel intend to guard the Druze in Syria if it had no intention of deploying forces in undefendable Druze localities, such because the Jarmana space, which included surrounding Druze villages similar to Sahnaiya and Ashrafiyat-Sahnaiya? Moreover, for a number of months earlier than the autumn of the Assad regime, the Druze province of Swaida organized day by day demonstrations in opposition to the Assad regime, through which the demonstrators referred to as for democratization and political reforms, in mild of the continual financial and safety scenario within the province, whereas Israel didn’t concern any warning to the Assad regime to chorus from suppressing the demonstrations on the time.
Netanyahu and Katz’s statements increase quite a lot of important questions: What was the aim or intention behind their assertion? Why was the message about Israel’s willingness to guard the Druze not secretly conveyed to the regime? Was this assertion about intervening in Syrian inner affairs so as to shield the Druze the truth is a camouflage and an instrumental gadget for Israel’s want to understand its strategic pursuits in Syria, which included: demilitarizing your entire space south of Damascus, and preserving Syria internally divided alongside sectarian traces and externally weak militarily.
It is very important word that one of many methods of the Druze and non secular minorities within the area is the precept of “Takiyya“, that’s, dissimulation or sustaining a low profile and even creating exterior visibility that the minority shouldn’t be truly completely different from the encircling Sunni majority amidst which it lives, so as to forestall a scenario through which the minority could be perceived as non-Muslim and therefore as a gaggle that’s perceived as heretic by Islamists (Dana, 2009). In brief, based mostly on the Takiyya, the Druze group sought to stay beneath the radar of Center East politics (Halabi, 2020), whereas Netanyahu’s assertion put the group within the highlight.
Right here it’s price mentioning that Israel occupied the Syrian Mount Hermon instantly after the autumn of the Assad regime in December 2024. Israel needed to occupy Syrian lands adjoining to its border so as to forestall any future assault on its cities, just like the one carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023. Moreover, Israel needed to maintain Syria divided and weak, and due to this fact Netanyahu thought that first, a sectarian battle between the Druze and Sunnis in Syria would supply Israel with a pretext to assault the regime and go away Syria divided. Second, any bloodbath of the Druze would spotlight the jihadist sectarian foundations of al-Sharaa regime, which might not hesitate slaughtering minorities and violate their collective rights.
Such atrocities would make it troublesome for any Western nation to determine diplomatic relations with this regime, whereas Israel tried to persuade Western nations to chorus from lifting sanctions that had been imposed on Syria throughout Assad’s reign. Israel feared that the Sharaa regime would handle to unite Syrian society and achieve forming a powerful military beneath an Islamist regime that would threaten Israel sooner or later to the identical extent as Hamas. In different phrases, Netanyahu didn’t actually intend to guard the Druze, however moderately to take advantage of their vulnerability to ignite a sectarian battle between them and the Sunnis and use them as a pretext to intervene in Syria’s inner affairs. The late April occasions in Syria surrounding the Druze minority in and across the metropolis of Jaramana illustrate that minorities in Syria are nearly powerless and can’t defend themselves in opposition to Islamist actions in a failed state that has neither the desire nor the capability to guard minorities from any sectarian violence.
Sadly for the Syrian Druze, on April 27, 2025, a fabricated audio recording was circulated on social media that allegedly confirmed a Druze sheikh uttering insults in opposition to the Prophet Muhammad. The recording sparked mass assaults on three remoted Druze cities, Jarmana, Sahnayyah, and Ashrafiyat-Sahnayyah, positioned on the southern outskirts of Damascus. Indignant Sunni-jihadi mobs broke into these Druze cities and murdered in chilly blood peaceable civilians together with ladies and kids. Along with the lethal bloodbath in these cities, Druze fighters who rushed from Swaida to guard their brethren within the three besieged cities had been ambushed by Bedouins who slaughtered them and even abused the our bodies of the murdered (movies of this abuse had been circulated on social media). The assaults resulted within the killing of over 100 Druzes, along with lots of of refugees and dozens of Druzes, who had been arrested, tortured, and a few had been even tortured to demise by regime forces within the prisons of the brand new regime.
These occasions and one which adopted in July in Swaida increase three questions concerning the statements of Israeli officers. Why did Netanyahu make such an announcement, whereas he understands that Israel can’t and isn’t keen to offer safety for remoted Druze cities positioned on the outskirts of Damascus, particularly in mild of the truth that the IDF was concerned in an extended and exhausting conflict within the Gaza Strip and when Israel was within the midst of peak preparations for the upcoming conflict that was on Israel’s agenda in opposition to Iran? Moreover, why did he concern the assertion whereas the IDF was perceived amongst Arab public opinion as a military that dedicated genocide in opposition to harmless Palestinians within the Gaza Strip, and due to this fact the extent of hatred in opposition to Israel among the many Arabs was at its zenith, whereas this hatred may have been directed in opposition to the susceptible Druze minority, and due to this fact did the Netanyahu authorities take into consideration the implications of his assertion? And at last, what was the intention of those that fabricated, cast and distributed the audio recording that incriminated a whole group within the eyes of the Sunni lots.
Concerning the final query, it seems that an opposition group to the Sharaa regime fabricated and distributed the audio recording so as to check Netanyahu’s intentions and see if he was critical in his assertion relating to Israel’s dedication to defending the Druze. The organized opposition teams aspired to overthrow the Sharaa regime included ISIS and teams affiliated with the previous Assad regime, whereas these teams needed to ignite a sectarian conflict between the Sunnis and the Druze that may result in the bloodbath of the latter so as to draw Israel right into a conflict in opposition to the newly established regime, relying on their half that Israel would fulfill its promise to the Druze and in addition hoping that these assaults would result in the toppling of the regime. In response to this model, the Druze had been nothing greater than a lure to undermine the foundations and even topple the brand new regime. In different phrases, Netanyahu’s assertion turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy that finally endangered your entire Syrian Druze group and led to their bloodbath.
Therefore, these assaults in opposition to the Druze in Syria created a vicious circle through which the biggest Druze militia in Swaida, the “Karama” males, refused handy over their weapons to the forces of the brand new regime out of mistrust and worry, provided that disarming themselves would render your entire group defenseless and extra susceptible to additional assaults, whereas the regime forces insisted on a monopoly on the technique of violence. Israel sensed the vulnerability of the Druze and opened fireplace from the air close to the presidential palace in Damascus in early Could 2025 and even landed weapons and ammunition within the Druze, Swaida district. All of those actions elevated hatred among the many Sunni group in Syria specifically and amongst Arab peoples typically in opposition to the Druze, creating an impression that introduced the Druze as a fifth column, that the Druze had been supposedly appearing on behalf of Israel, as in the event that they had been looking for to destabilize the brand new regime.
It must be emphasised that minorities typically and the Druze group in Syria specifically are led by conventional clerics, who don’t have any expertise in overseas relations and worldwide diplomacy, and due to this fact these clerics have low diplomatic expertise, whereas the group as a complete is powerless within the inner stability of energy in Syria, provided that the Druze in Syria represent solely 5 % of your entire inhabitants. Moreover, social media networks, together with Fb and Instagram, had been stuffed with an unprecedented assault in opposition to the Druze, presenting your entire group as in the event that they had been placing sticks within the wheels of the consolidating Syrian unity. On this anti-Druze environment, Druze had been kidnapped each day, younger Druze males had been murdered wherever they had been discovered, particularly on the streets of Damascus, all Druze college students had been expelled in lots from Syrian universities in a shameful and outrageous spectacle, Druze ladies had been kidnapped and raped, whereas fewer and fewer provides of meals, gasoline and medication reached the Swaida province beginning in Could 2025.
Between the bloodbath in Could within the Jarmana space and the grand bloodbath in Swaida in mid-July, there have been makes an attempt to achieve an settlement on the deployment of the brand new regime’s forces within the Swaida space. The Druze within the Swaida province realized that they had been in a catch-22. On the one hand, they understood that the entry of the Al-Sharaa regime forces may result in a massacre related to those who occurred within the Alawite space in March and the bloodbath in Jarmana in early Could. Alternatively, additionally they understood that the dearth of an settlement may result in an invasion by the regime forces, the outcomes of which might be much more devastating. Three political/religious leaders of the Druze (Al-Hajri, Hennawi, and Jarboa) operated within the Druze Mountains, in addition to two extra militias, alongside the massive Druze militia of the “Karama” males. On the finish of Could, the events reached an settlement that may enable the entry of the regime forces, contingent on the situation that the native forces would combine into the official inner safety apparatuses within the Druze Mountain, in order that the native safety militias would represent the lion’s share of those regime forces. It is very important word that the Druze militias aren’t instantly subordinate to any of the religious/political Druze leaders. Nonetheless, after the settlement was signed on the finish of Could, Al-Hajri backed down and even expressed opposition to the entry of the regime forces into the Druze Mountain. Within the absence of consensus among the many Druze factions, the settlement proposal collapsed.
There is no such thing as a dependable info as to why Al-Hajri backed down and expressed sturdy opposition to an orderly entry of regime forces. It’s believed that the Netanyahu authorities, via the pinnacle of the Druze group in Israel, Mwafak Tarif, urged Al-Hajri to oppose such a deployment, particularly in mild of the truth that Israel aimed to protect the world south of Damascus as a demilitarized zone. On the similar time, a number of days earlier than the lethal assault on Swaida, there was an try by the Al-Sharaa regime to achieve an settlement with the leaders of the Kurdish area relating to the growth of the regime’s management to the Kurdish area, and the Al-Sharaa regime needed to subdue the Swaida area earlier than it turned to the Kurdish area.
The lethal assault in opposition to the Swaida area started on July 13,2025 and lasted a few week. Earlier than the assault, the pinnacle of the Israeli Nationwide Safety Council, Tzahi Hanegbi, met with senior officers of the Al-Sharaa regime in Azerbaijan, when Al-Sharaa himself visited this nation on July 12,2025, that’s, two days earlier than the assault on Swaida. Therefore is the assertion that Israel knew and even gave the inexperienced mild for the entry of Sharaa forces geared up with mild weapons into the Swaida district, which stands in contradiction with Israel’s dedication to the autonomy of the mountain.
The truth is, the regime forces had been joined by forces of Bedouin tribes from all corners of the nation, particularly from the Deir ez-Zor area, in addition to ISIS forces whose members aren’t Syrians, a few of whom don’t even converse Arabic. In different phrases, each the regime and different Sunni militias participated within the incursion in opposition to Swaida. These forces had one clear purpose: mass slaughter and complete extermination of the Druze within the Swaida district and that’s based mostly on testimonies of prisoners who had been captured by the Druze militias. Along with the roughly 725 Druze fighters and civilians killed within the battles, over 554 harmless Druze civilians had been executed in chilly blood, together with sufferers who had been slaughtered of their beds and medical employees on the Swaida hospital, the place movies circulated on social media networks exhibit the atrocities. All in all, 1279 Druzes had been killed out of group of 650,000, or 2 out 1000 Druze residents. Whole households had been worn out, unarmed younger males had been murdered by a firing squad within the squares of Swaida. But, the plight of the Druze didn’t cease as soon as the ceasefire settlement was reached; the sectarian killing of Druzes persevered on day by day foundation, the place Jihadi squads have focused members of the Druze and different minorities, particularly Alawis, each day in each main Syrian metropolis. These squads exploit the safety chaos in Syria, they usually perform sectarian-based execution of males and kidnap ladies with impunity.
One of many motives of those forces was the Jihadist component, as Islamist actions see the Druze together with Alawis as sect of infidels whose blood is permitted and even inspired by a divine decree. Druze ladies had been kidnapped and lots of of them had been raped. And right here the query arises, why didn’t Israel oppose the entry of al-Sharaa forces into the Swaida district at the Azerbaijan assembly on July 12? Did Israel inform the Druze leaders in Swaida about this upcoming assault? The truth that Israel didn’t assault the forces that invaded Swaida on July 14 signifies that Israel agreed in precept to the entry of those forces into the Druze Mountain. Israel attacked these of the Sharaa forces in Swaida and Damascus solely after the extent of the massacres started to leak via social media networks, and it is very important word that the regime lower off the connection to the Web networks in Swaida in the course of the days of the assault.
The Druze group is led by conventional clerics (sheikhs) who, by advantage of their spiritual standing, have grow to be the de facto political leaders of the group. These sheikhs, together with Mwafak Tarif in Israel, Al-Hajri, Hennawi and Jarboa in Swaida, are inexperienced in worldwide relations they usually (maybe) naively trusted Netanyahu’s false promise and thereby put the destiny of complete group in Syria beneath an existential risk. These conventional leaders don’t perceive the stability of energy on the bottom, some acted out of feelings and others out of private curiosity. Certainly, Al-Hajri adopted a hardline place vis-à-vis the Sharaa regime and foiled any entry of the brand new regime forces even earlier than the massacres in Jaraman and Swaida occurred, whereas Hennawi and Jarboa acknowledged the legitimacy of the Sharaa regime. It must be famous nevertheless that apparently, Netanyahu transferred messages and even directions to al-Hajri via Tarif, the official religious head of the Druze group in Israel and the pinnacle of the Druze spiritual courtroom in Israel.
Following the July bloodbath, nevertheless, a consensus has been fashioned amongst all three Syrian-Druze religious leaders that Al-Sharaa regime orchestrated the atrocities in opposition to the Druze civilians, and that the regime gave orders to its forces and the Jihadi militias that accompanied them to hold out an extermination plan in opposition to the Druze. Consequently, all Syrian-Druze leaders rejected any contact with the Sharaa regime and began considering the concept of secession from Syria as the one technique for the group’s survival. But it must be famous that whereas these conventional leaders act out feelings after being outraged by the bloodbath, they don’t have any navy or diplomatic energy to understand their targets. They primarily depend on Israel and hope that Israel’s assist is adequate to understand their aspiration for independence or autonomy. Additionally it is attainable that a few of these leaders, particularly Al-Hajri, act out of self-interest of aspiring to grow to be the pinnacle of the longer term Druze state. But, these wishful pondering might exacerbate the battle with Damascus and convey one other mass atrocities and even genocide in opposition to the group. Lastly, if Israel is earnest about serving to out the Druze minority, it ought to achieve this via covert, secretive channels, with out turning this minority into its collaborator, in any other case, such public assertion illustrates the minority as a fifth column in eyes of the Syrian society.
On the regional stage, we’re witnessing the chapter of the nation-state in multi-ethnic Center Jap states, similar to Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The sectarian violence mixed with the rise of Jihadi regimes weaken the nationwide sentiment and the sense of belonging to those states, whereas the return to tribalism and sectarianism creates a political and safety vacuum, the place Jihadi teams perform atrocities in opposition to minorities with impunity. The rise of Islamist forces to energy mixed with the political vacuum in them has finally ushered within the elimination of “infidel” spiritual minorities in these nations, such because the Druze, Christians, Baha’is, Alawites, and Yazidis, and so on. Israel and the West ought to have each an ethical and safety curiosity in preserving the existence of those minorities, who demand Western humanitarian intervention, provided that the West confirmed sensitivity and expressed main concern to the violation of minority rights. Netanyahu’s false or empty guarantees not solely don’t result in the constructing mutual belief between Israel and ethnic minorities within the Center East, however might even invite main calamity in opposition to a minority that’s misled by empty slogans.
The massacres within the Jaraman and Swaida districts in April and July, 2025, respectively, aren’t inevitable. Earlier than the bloodbath in Jaramana and even after it, nearly all of the Druze inhabitants in Syria collectively wit its two reasonable religious leaders, Hennawi and Jarboa, leaned in the direction of coming to phrases with the Sharaa regime. Sadly, the Druze minority in Syria was caught between Netanyahu’s Machiavellianism, the place he sought to make use of the Druze minority so as to weaken the Sharaa regime domestically and internationally, and the Sharaa regime’s Islamist and Jihadist ideology, who’re satisfied that killing members of an “infidel” minority is sanctioned by Islam and constitutes a divine decree. As a small powerless minority, the assault by the Jihadi forces in opposition to the Druze deepened the group’s dependence on Israel, as their solely savior and certainly Israel’s assaults in opposition to the regime militias pressured the latter to withdraw from Swaida. But, the extra the Syrian Druze minority fashioned shut reference to, and deepened their dependency on Israel and the Netanyahu authorities, the extra they had been perceived as infidels and traitors within the eyes of Sunni Muslims.
References
Dana, N. (2009). Druze identification, faith–Custom and apostasy. Shnaton, 9(6), 5-20.
Halabi, Y. (2020). Tiny spiritual minorities and minority group rights: the case of the Druze group. Social Identities, 26(6), 739-755.
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