Adam Humphreys is Affiliate Professor and Head of Division within the Division of Politics and Worldwide Relations, College of Studying. He joined the College of Studying in 2013, having beforehand been a British Academy Put up-Doctoral Fellow on the College of Oxford (2007–10) and Fellow in Politics at Brasenose School, Oxford (2010–13). His principal analysis pursuits are in Worldwide Relations concept and metatheory, particularly causation and causal clarification, realism and neorealism, the English College, and the connection between concept and historical past. He additionally has analysis pursuits in British international and defence coverage, technique, and the ethics of struggle.
The place do you see probably the most thrilling analysis/debates occurring in your subject?
I feel there’s quite a lot of very thrilling analysis happening in many alternative areas. In relation to causal inquiry, I’m usually impressed by the ingenuity of what Hidemi Suganami and I, following Thad Dunning (2012), time period ‘design-based’ approaches to causal inference – approaches which try to safe the inner validity of a causal inference by way of the analysis design, i.e. by way of an experiment or pure experiment. In Causal Inquiry in Worldwide Relations, we look at a few examples of this strategy in some element.
Nevertheless, it’s a key competition of our guide that causal inquiry must be construed broadly – that many individuals are doing work that contributes (or might contribute) to the event of causal information, even when they’d not essentially describe themselves as conducting causal inquiries. So, whereas taking a look at design-based approaches, we additionally present, for instance, how historic work can plausibly contribute to the event of causal information, whether or not this work is offered as ‘process-tracing’ or as ‘historical past’. Talking personally, I’ve been delighted to watch the latest resurgence of ‘Historic Worldwide Relations’ and in addition the continued efforts to excavate the historical past of ‘Worldwide Relations’ as a self-discipline, together with its racist and imperialist undercurrents.
That stated, one of many frustrations expressed in our guide is that causal inquiry is commonly conceived reasonably narrowly, contributing to the impression of a ‘divided self-discipline’. For instance, it’s a hanging characteristic of historic work in IR at current that it largely avoids causal language. In the meantime, the ‘causal inference’ literature incessantly dismisses the worth of historic work, failing to acknowledge how a ‘single case research’ might generate causal information. You will need to observe, in fact, that historic work can have many goals and that displaying how and why a selected final result occurred is just one of them. It is usually essential to acknowledge that producing causal information is just one purpose of analysis in IR, although an essential one. I’m satisfied, nonetheless, that we’d be collectively higher off if we might acknowledge the breadth of the way by which causal information could be generated and the potential of a lot totally different work to contribute to this endeavour.
How has the best way you perceive the world modified over time, and what (or who) prompted probably the most important shifts in your pondering?
My early work was very a lot targeted on ‘concept’ and on ‘theories’ of IR. The puzzle which motivated me was the query of what ‘concept’ in IR is and what it’s presupposed to do for us. Briefly, what sort of information are we looking for to generate in IR and the way is that this most persuasively completed?
A key approach by which my work has developed over time is that I’ve moved away from approaching this query by way of engagement with ‘grand theories’ in IR. On this respect, my very own work has in all probability moved in lock step with the self-discipline at massive the place, as I see it, the main focus is extra on mid-range theories and the applying of specific strategies and approaches than on the grand theories which had been nonetheless in vogue once I first studied worldwide relations.
A key discovery, for me, was that work on causation and causal inquiry in IR supplied, because it appeared to me, a way more fruitful avenue by way of which to pursue the epistemological questions I had at all times been taken with than work on ‘concept’. I used to be significantly influenced by Hidemi Suganami’s On the Causes of Conflict (1996), not only for its content material but additionally for the cautious and considerate approach by which he sought to navigate the difficult conceptual points this matter raises. I used to be additionally strongly influenced by Milja Kurki’s Causation in Worldwide Relations (2008) and Patrick Jackson’s The Conduct of Inquiry in Worldwide Relations (2011) the place in fact, the title of our guide nods to each of those, however for me, the important thing factor was discovering, in Hidemi, somebody who was already fascinated about issues in the best way I needed to.
How would you describe “causal claims” or “causation” in Worldwide Relations?
Crudely, my key thought right here is that it’s in all probability extra useful to deal with ‘causal claims’ than on ‘causation’. Debates about ‘causation’ are typically about what causation is and, particularly, whether or not it’s ‘actual’. A key driver of those debates in IR has been a dissatisfaction with the restrictions of a so-called ‘Humean’ or ‘idealist’ strategy to causal inquiry targeted on the seek for regularities (or patterns of covariation) and the notion {that a} shift in the direction of ‘causal realism’ would possibly open new and richer avenues for causal inquiry. Nevertheless, Hidemi and I are sceptical each concerning the studying of Hume as a causal idealist and about the concept that in conducting causal inquiry it’s vital both to be an ‘idealist’ or a ‘realist’ about causation. In our view, it isn’t doable to know whether or not causation is in reality a part of the world because it exists independently of human thought (how might we all know that?!) and nor it’s vital. As human beings, all of us make sense of the world partially by way of the concept that it comprises causal relations, however as researchers in IR, we will get on with the enterprise of causal inquiry – exploring what we consider as being ‘causal relations’ by growing and evaluating ‘causal claims’ – with out having first to resolve basically metaphysical questions.
Against this, we expect there is a gigantic profit to be gained from pondering extra fastidiously concerning the nature of ‘causal claims’, about how they are often supported by empirical proof, and about what they do and don’t inform us concerning the world. Adopting this focus is essential not solely as a result of a key purpose of analysis in IR is to develop causal information, but additionally as a result of there are some fairly pervasive misunderstandings about these points in IR. Specifically, there’s a tendency to suppose, wrongly, that statements of the shape ‘brief circuits trigger fires’ or ‘revolutions trigger wars’ are in some sense ‘basic’ and that if such claims are acceptable then we should always be capable to observe corresponding patterns of covariation on the planet round us – brief circuits must be routinely adopted by fires and revolutions must be routinely adopted by wars. In Causal Inquiry in Worldwide Relations, we present that statements comparable to ‘brief circuits trigger fires’ and ‘revolutions trigger wars’ are propensity statements; they inform us {that a} brief circuit will result in a fireplace or a revolution will result in a struggle solely underneath the proper situations. Because it seems, this has some fairly profound methodological implications.
In what methods does Scientific Realism (SR) affect mainstream approaches to causal inquiry?
It’s value beginning by saying that SR has nothing by any means to do with realism in IR. Actually, as Jonathan Joseph, amongst others, has identified, realists comparable to Waltz are not scientific realists! Roughly talking, to be a Scientific Realist is to consider within the actuality – existence – of what’s described by our greatest scientific theories, particularly unobservable entities, comparable to quarks. Put barely in a different way: Scientific Realism is a philosophical place to the impact that perception within the actuality of no matter is described by our greatest theories is required by science. SR has influenced IR, and the social sciences, primarily as a proposed different to positivism/empiricism, which is characterised, from the SR perspective, as ‘instrumentalist’. The fundamental concept right here is that we are going to not reach growing persuasive theories about, for instance, the construction of the worldwide system if we deal with this construction in an ‘instrumentalist’ vogue and easily say that states behave as if it had been actual. To develop persuasive theories, we have to take significantly the concept that social buildings are actual and have generative results. That is roughly the view underpinning Alex Wendt’s early and influential critique of Waltz.
In relation to causal inquiry in IR, SR is most carefully related to the concept that causal inquiry ought to search to establish ‘mechanisms’. In Causal Inquiry in Worldwide Relations, we agree that it’s vital to differentiate sharply between proof that there’s a correlation between two variables and proof that there’s a causal relation between them. One other approach of placing this is likely to be that there could be no causal relation between occasions of specific sorts until there’s a ‘mechanism’ linking them. However we discover such language unhelpful; it offers an unjustifiable and typically unhelpful ‘mechanistic’ colouring to our image of how causal relations unfold. In any case, it’s clearly not essential to embrace SR to make the straightforward level that ‘correlation just isn’t causation’ and we’re sceptical of whether or not subscribing to an ‘ontology’ of powers, mechanisms, and the like provides a lot to causal inquiry.
How can one set up agency epistemic grounds to supply causal explanations and navigate differing levels of causal complexity?
The time period ‘causal clarification’ typically will get utilized in fairly a broad approach. For instance, Patrick Jackson, in his new guide, Information and Explanations in Worldwide Research … and Past (2024), equates a causal clarification with a recipe for bringing about an final result of a selected form. It’s additionally widespread to listen to folks speak of ‘theories’ as containing or offering ‘explanations’. In Causal Inquiry in Worldwide Relations, we defend a narrower but additionally less complicated view: a causal clarification is an account of how an final result of curiosity was caused. The only type of such a proof is the assertion ‘a brought on b’; this assertion explains the prevalence of b by pointing to one among its causes, a.
With a purpose to have agency epistemic grounds on which to advance such a proof, we have to ensure that a did in reality contribute to the bringing about of b! Conceptually talking, that is apparent, however virtually talking it’s going to typically be very troublesome to attain. To ensure that a contributed to the bringing about of b we must ensure that b was not caused by a mixture of occasions which doesn’t embody a. There’ll typically be many such competing explanations to rule out and restricted proof on which to attract. For this reason experiments, if they are often deployed, are so highly effective: if we will present that the introduction of a was the one factor that modified, resulting in the prevalence of b, then we shall be very assured in ruling out competing explanations of how b was caused and therefore we will also be very assured in advancing the declare ‘a brought on b’. Sadly, there are lots of essential analysis questions in IR which aren’t conducive to experimental investigation. In any case, there is a vital distinction between establishing, via an experiment, that A-type occasions trigger B-type occasions and displaying, within the particular case of curiosity, that b was brought on by a.
If this provides some sense of the sensible difficulties concerned in growing epistemically safe causal explanations, there’s additionally a conceptual complication which is commonly missed, viz. in evaluating a causal clarification it’s vital to concentrate not solely to the epistemic grounds on which it’s superior but additionally its pragmatic orientation. In different phrases, it’s vital to think about whether or not a proof in reality solutions the query to which it’s supplied as a solution. Suppose you had been to ask for a proof of what brought on World Conflict I and somebody had been to say ‘Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand brought on the struggle’. It will be fairly cheap to reply by saying one thing like ‘sure, I do know all concerning the speedy lead as much as the struggle, however I used to be questioning what the deeper causes had been’. This response signifies that the unique clarification was insufficient as a result of it was insufficiently detailed or complicated.
Discover that in an effort to suppose clearly concerning the significance of ‘complexity’ in relation to causal clarification it’s vital to differentiate the 2 fairly totally different points I’ve touched on right here. One concern considerations how straightforward it’s to point out, epistemically, that one occasion, a, brought on one other occasion, b. This shall be best in an artificially simplified experimental setting and can sometimes be a lot more durable within the on a regular basis world the place there are a number of simultaneous and interacting causal processes in play, all or any of which can have contributed to the bringing about of b. A second concern considerations whether or not an epistemically justified clarification, ‘a brought on b’, is ‘complicated sufficient’ to fulfill its viewers. A lot of the present dialogue of causal clarification and causal complexity in IR fails to differentiate these two points clearly.
How would you clarify Weber’s ‘supreme sorts’ and its software to the thought of ‘concert events’ in world politics? What challenges would possibly a great sort live performance face within the context of Twenty first-century world governance?
I explored ‘concert events’ and ‘live performance governance’ as a part of a multi-year, multi-national venture run out of the Peace Analysis Institute Frankfurt on safety preparations suited to a multipolar 21st-centry world. In my contribution to this venture, I drew on Weber’s idea of an ‘supreme sort’ to deal with the problem of the right way to outline a ‘live performance’ given the need, on the one hand, to be taught classes from the 19th-century Live performance of Europe and the apparent reality, then again, that any 21st-century live performance association must differ significantly from its 19th-century predecessor.
Roughly talking, a Weberian ‘supreme sort’ (as articulated in ‘The “Objectivity” of Information in Social Science and Social Coverage’) is a conceptual illustration or abstraction which supplies expression to the underlying concepts which we draw upon, typically implicitly, to categorise real-world phenomena. On this case, I used to be within the underlying concept of ‘live performance governance’ by reference to which we classify sure precise, historically-situated units of institutional preparations as both being or not being, ‘concert events’. The benefit of this strategy is that it permits us to think about considerably totally different institutional preparations, in several historic contexts, as sharing a form of ‘household resemblance’ adequate to justify labelling all of them as ‘concert events’. This, in flip, permits us to scrutinize the methods by which varied overlapping units of institutional preparations would possibly all facilitate the pursuit of ‘live performance governance’ in a 21st-century context.
It follows from this strategy {that a} 21st-century ‘live performance’ wouldn’t exactly match the ‘supreme sort’, however would reasonably depart from it in methods applicable to its context. Nevertheless, pondering in a Weberian vein can enable us to establish among the generic strengths and weaknesses of ‘live performance governance’ and to suppose by way of how these would possibly manifest in a 21st-century live performance. Briefly, the strengths of ‘live performance governance’ is likely to be stated to incorporate informality and adaptableness, the capability to accommodate nice energy pursuits and to fulfill their standing aspirations, and the capability to scale back violent dysfunction. Its weaknesses would possible embody considerations round legitimacy, inclusion, and justice. Briefly, ‘live performance governance’ is likely to be stated to worth a sure conception of order over a sure conception of justice. Arguably, establishments such because the UN Basic Meeting do the alternative, however then that is additionally, arguably, what makes them ineffectual!
One of many major goals of your guide is to bridge the hole between philosophical debates on causation and methodological observe. How do you see these two areas—philosophical reflection and empirical methodology—interacting, and why is it essential to combine them extra successfully in IR scholarship?
One of many issues we search to deal with is that philosophical and methodological debates have change into fairly indifferent. On the philosophical finish, it is because debates about whether or not these conducting causal inquiry ought to embrace SR are primarily a query of perception or dedication, not a query of methodology. On the methodological finish, it is because the deal with comparatively slender questions on how specific strategies or strategies are greatest utilized within the service of causal inquiry inevitably brackets deeper philosophical questions.
In our guide, we have now sought to point out how exact, philosophically-informed pondering could be productively utilized not solely to metaphysical questions but additionally to methodological questions. Specifically, we focus consideration on the character of causal statements (or claims – see above) and the query of how totally different sorts of statements could be empirically supported. We present that though the purpose of causal inquiry is often to ascertain assist for causal claims with broad applicability, comparable to ‘revolutions trigger wars’, in reality, the one form of causal assertion that may be examined towards empirical proof is a case-specific declare about an occasion or set of occasions which has already occurred. This helps to disclose what we name a ‘deep logic’ to causal inquiry, a logic which has some important methodological corollaries. For instance, we show the innate dependence of causal inquiry on information of particular, previous occasions, one thing that has been solely missed in present methodological discussions in IR, which are likely to privilege cross-case research and the applying of quantitative strategies.
Briefly, the explanation that you will need to combine philosophical and methodological pondering extra carefully in IR is that doing so can generate essential methodological insights. Though our strategy is philosophically-informed, we’re writing in and for these conducting causal inquiries in IR, not (or not primarily) for philosophers!
You recommend that causal inquiries are usually not solely methodological but additionally have important political implications. How can students conducting causal analysis stay reflexive concerning the political stakes of their findings, particularly when these findings would possibly affect coverage or world energy dynamics?
It’s possible that causal inquiries in IR will very often have political implications insofar as they’ll reveal how outcomes of specific sorts can probably be caused or prevented. Certainly, growing this type of information is a key goal of causal inquiry. On this context, a part of remaining reflexive is to acknowledge that whereas we have now an obligation to be scrupulous about how we conduct analysis and the way we report our findings, we have now actual and essential selections to make about which concern to deal with in our analysis. It’s fairly correct that such selections must be knowledgeable by moral and political judgements about what is critical and priceless both to us as researchers or to those that might draw on our analysis.
One of many goals of our guide is to show how a variety of methodological approaches can be utilized to generate causal information and to point out how causal inquiry can complement normative, interpretive, essential, and historic inquiry. In our view, you will need to acknowledge the really wide selection of questions that causal inquiry can probably assist to reply and to not prohibit our causal investigations solely to these questions that are answerable by way of the applying of a selected set of strategies. Nevertheless, it’s for particular person students to make their very own judgements about what they want to research and why.
How can students in IR keep ethically conscious when their analysis might need political penalties? Do you suppose that paying extra consideration to the politics of causation might change how analysis is completed within the subject?
I don’t suppose there’s a ‘politics of causation’, however solely a politics to the form of questions we ask (see above). Nevertheless, there’s maybe a form of ‘disciplinary politics’ round causal inquiry, by which it’s handy each to some students who want to focus causal inquiries across the software of specific strategies and to some students who reject the very concept of causal inquiry to propagate a very slender account of what causal inquiry consists in. Our guide follows within the footsteps of each Kurki’s Causation in Worldwide Relations (2008) and Jackson’s The Conduct of Inquiry in Worldwide Relations in rejecting this type of ‘disciplinary politics’.
What’s a very powerful recommendation you could possibly give to younger students of Worldwide Relations?
Attempt to discover a steadiness between two essential however typically competing items. First, pursuing your mental pursuits fervently, wherever they might lead, and frequently combating to create space for the potential of pondering in a different way, or no less than independently. Second, search out a neighborhood of students working in an space you may contribute to and amongst whom you may think about feeling valued and supported.
Additional Studying on E-Worldwide Relations
