The debates across the coming US election primarily concentrate on its home implications or penalties for large points in international politics, such because the Russia-Ukraine battle, NATO’s future, and the China-Taiwan or Palestine-Israel conflicts. Nonetheless, the result of the US election could affect quite a lot of different susceptible areas. A living proof is the South Caucasus, with its at the moment reworking order, inner tensions, and a variety of international pursuits concerned. The newest survey performed by the Pew Analysis Centre reveals vast partisan gaps in figuring out the US prime international coverage priorities. The general public perspective of People is split over points like strengthening NATO and the UN, selling human rights overseas and sustaining US navy benefit. Equally, conflicting perceptions may be noticed amongst US politicians. As Jordan Tama argues, the elevated polarisation and collapse of the consensus on liberal internationalism imply a bipartisan compact on America’s international function is unlikely to occur.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus (additionally known as Transcaucasus) is essentially comprised of at the moment’s nation-states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The US technique within the South Caucasus has gone by means of totally different levels. Firstly of the Nineties, any aspirations about increasing the US attain within the area have been hampered by ethnic conflicts, the rise of nationalist forces and the commonly destabilised political atmosphere within the three Transcaucasian states. From the early 2000s, US expectations within the area got impetus by some efforts for democratic transition in Georgia, resulted within the so-called Rose Revolution. Later, the Russia-Georgia battle in 2008 made additional growth of Western establishments and values tough. Rumer et al. write that since that second, US politics there grew to become declaratory with diminished expectations. Till now, the US perspective in direction of the Transcaucasus was certainly inertial. Although, the transition of energy in Armenia in 2018, the brand new regional order after the 2020 Karabakh battle and additional escalations in 2022-2023 may need made the US decision-makers rethink their pursuits and expectations.
Present US targets within the area are offered within the newest built-in nation methods revealed within the spring of 2022 by the US Division of State. In Armenia, Washington pursues three principal targets. First, it goals at strengthening democratic establishments, combating corruption and defending human rights. Secondly, the US seeks to advertise commerce, funding, and power cooperation within the nation. Specifically, the targets are to enhance competitiveness, scale back obstacles in commerce and funding and improve Armenia’s power and water safety. Thirdly, the US builds partnerships to deal with international and regional threats, advancing reconciliation efforts, supporting defence sector reforms and strengthening Armenia’s capability to conduct peacekeeping operations and reply to pure and man-made disasters.
In Azerbaijan, the US needs to bolster Baku’s contribution to regional and worldwide peace. Washington tries to assist cooperation and reconciliation efforts and strengthen Baku’s capabilities to counter home and transnational safety threats. The nation’s technique additionally encourages Azerbaijan to diversify its economic system and construct nearer ties with the USA. The important thing targets are to assist the Southern Fuel Hall and European power safety, appeal to US direct funding, obtain Azerbaijan’s dedication to a inexperienced economic system and its involvement in impartial and Western-led financial and environmental initiatives. Washington additionally goals to stimulate civil society establishments and grow to be a extra seen companion of Azerbaijan by offering a greater understanding of United States tradition and values. The US can also be in Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic and regional integration and in rising its functionality to deal with home and international threats. Just like the 2 neighbouring international locations, it’s anticipated of Georgia to strengthen democracy, rule of legislation and anti-corruption efforts, a lot important for the Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations. Within the financial space, the US seeks to foster a clear market-based economic system open to US funding, diversified commerce and inclusive, higher-value employment.
A number of issues are clearly noticed right here. Within the South Caucasus, the US focuses on the regional stability and normalisation of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, spurring peace as a elementary situation for unlocking regional potential within the economic system. Then, it considers Georgia’s integration with the West extra promising and possible. Lastly, the US recognises the significance of getting Azerbaijan as an financial companion, bearing in mind its function in regional transit initiatives and power provide functionality.
There are a number of components in 2024 that can impression the brief and long-term way forward for the area. First, Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged on a peace settlement. It appears that evidently they’re now nearer to the peace deal than ever. There are nonetheless three sticking factors in reaching this deal, such because the demarcation of borders, worldwide ensures and dispute decision mechanisms, and opening the Zangezur Hall – a transit route connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan by means of Armenia’s territory. The primary two points usually are not insoluble and may be settled with the diplomatic efforts and political will of the events. In distinction, the third level concerning transportation infrastructure and connectivity presents essentially the most difficult downside. The 9th provision of the 2020 Trilateral Assertion (armistice settlement that ended the Second Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict) states that “all financial and transport hyperlinks within the area shall be unblocked”, and Armenia shall assure transport communication between Azerbaijan’s western areas and Nakhichevan to arrange the motion of residents, autos and cargo. Nonetheless, the 2 international locations have reverse views and interpretations of this provision, and Armenia doesn’t need its territory for use for the worldwide hall managed by Baku. This subject is commonly thought of a risk of additional escalation. Such considerations are shared not solely in Armenia but in addition in Iran, presenting them as a danger for its sole land border with Armenia and a related commerce route.
Other than the obstacles to the peace deal, there are equally necessary points deserving consideration. Such points embrace demining huge territories in Nagorno-Karabakh, exchanging prisoners of battle, reintegrating Karabakh Armenians prepared to return to their properties, restoring the cultural heritage, setting up narratives of peace between the 2 nations, and implementing the widespread environmental coverage of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia inside the Caspian-Caucasian bioregion.
Second, Georgia is anticipating parliamentary elections in late October 2024, the place the Georgian Dream – the Russia-friendly ruling get together – will attempt to preserve energy. The outcomes of those elections will definitely impression the way forward for EU-Georgia relations and customarily decide the nation’s international coverage course for the next 4 years. However even when (it’s uncertain) the newly elected parliament will, in its majority, encompass pro-Western opposition, there are components not favouring strengthening cooperation with the West. The brand new geopolitical actuality established with none salient involvement of any Western state or establishment diminished their function and potential energy within the area. Georgian Dream get together and its pro-Russian stance usually are not the one issues in Georgia’s means towards Euro-Atlantic integration. This was brilliantly illustrated by Kornely Kakachia. On the one hand, Georgia witnesses the evolving regional safety structure that excludes Western companions. Then again, Russian regional presence is perceived as an existential risk to Georgian sovereignty. Eugene Kogan explains that at the moment’s Tbilisi has come to a political deadlock. It has no allies prepared to guard Georgia in case of any navy battle. A few of its territories have been annexed in 2008 and stay beneath Russian strategic management. The society is politically divided, and anti-Western rhetoric utilized by the ruling get together challenges its relations with the EU.
Third, the uncertainty of the present second stems from the rising uncertainty of the worldwide political context. The complete-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 resulted within the altering affect of Moscow within the South Caucasus. It now has the bottom stage of relations with Armenia – previously the principle ally within the area. Erevan has frozen its relations with the Collective Safety Treaty Group, ratified the Worldwide Legal Court docket’s Rome Statute, and is actively trying to diversify its safety companions. The alliance between Azerbaijan and Türkiye has grow to be the most important energy within the area. Türkiye considerably intensified the strategic and navy cooperation with Baku. In a post-war order of 2024, Ankara’s priorities are regional peace and connectivity. It might think about the reducing stage of Russia’s energy within the area as a window of alternative to ascertain a secure safety structure, in addition to an inclusive commerce and financial system related to different logistic packages, such because the Trans-Caspian Worldwide Transport Route. Ankara sought to construct a regional mechanism of cooperation. Within the 2000s, it initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Then, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan put ahead the “3+3” Platform for Regional Cooperation in 2020, which endeavoured to undermine the West’s affect within the South Caucasus by limiting the regional cooperation to Russia, Türkiye and Iran plus Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia refused to take part on this format, and it seemed to be simply one other failure to create an inclusive regional cooperation mechanism, both with or with out the West.
Russia is making an attempt to reshape its coverage in Transcaucasia based on new geopolitical actuality and inside the ongoing rivalry with the West. Regardless that it’s shedding direct management and energy over the area, the exclusion of the Western attain there may be thought of a victory for Moscow. The absence of Russia’s present strategic imaginative and prescient on the South Caucasus makes it take a reactive method, able to adapt to any order that isn’t depending on the West. As Azizi and Isachenko rightly emphasise, “a ‘much less Russia, extra Turkey’ dynamic heightens Tehran’s apprehensions in direction of Ankara”. Iran is worried in regards to the Zangezur Hall, which primarily empowers Azerbaijan’s and Türkiye’s positions and threatens to complicate Tehran’s entry to Armenia and isolate it from international commerce routes. Moreover, Iran is pissed off by deepening of Azerbaijan-Israeli navy and financial relations. On the similar time, the choice to assemble the Aras hall connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland and its exclave by means of Iranian territory illustrates the advance of ties with Baku and the cooling of relations with Erevan. It may be defined as Tehran’s try and adapt to the altering regional order and profit from the place it could actually. Nonetheless, additionally it is brought on by Armenia’s try to contain Western states in regional politics.
A brand new regional order within the South Caucasus established after Azerbaijan regained its sovereign territory brings altering energy dynamics and creates an important alternative both for peace, integration, and prosperity or for a brand new wave of geopolitical rivalry. Too many important issues are on the agenda at the moment. There’s nonetheless no consent over some safety and financial points. And there’s no regional platform representing the three states that is ready to present fast and dealing options. Every of the three Transcaucasian international locations or these neighbouring states like Türkiye, Iran and Russia are following the US election intrigue. So, the result of the US election not solely impacts American international coverage itself however most likely impacts the conduct of the regional actors. Beneath are a number of observations made on this subject.
Georgia’s constant efforts to hitch the European Union and NATO at the moment are in danger due to the adoption of authoritarian legislation on international affect. Moreover, the prospects of Trump being re-elected within the US, in actual fact, make Tbilisi precisely align its politics with Russia. Undoubtedly, pro-Western forces in Georgia choose that Democrats win the election. However in any case, whether or not Trump or Harris will take the White Home, the way forward for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration is questionable if the ruling get together will maintain energy and proceed its political line. The present Georgian Prime Minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, holds a pro-Republican stance and reproduces narratives in regards to the “international battle get together” or “liberal fascism”. Kobakhidze shouldn’t be the one chief within the area who helps Trump’s coming to energy.
In July 2024, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev expressed his choice to work with Trump and the US Republican administration. Constructing a brand new safety order and positioning itself as a rising center energy, Azerbaijan must minimise international interference within the South Caucasus. From this angle, Trump’s “America first” agenda and the proposed foreign-policy isolationism of the US play in favour of Baku’s pursuits. A transparent home focus of the 2024 Republican get together platform means Armenia needs to be cautious when relying on US assist within the subsequent 4 years. It was throughout Trump’s earlier presidency when Azerbaijan defeated separatists and took again lands occupied by Armenia. And it was Trump who rejected to recognise the Armenian ‘genocide’ by the late Ottoman empire. The Republican non-interventionist stance shouldn’t be ubiquitous. Some points, such because the assist of Israel, are nonetheless on Trump’s agenda. Although the South Caucasus is clearly of much less worth for Republicans.
Reverse to this, in her social media, Harris brazenly declared that she considers the mass killings of Armenians as ‘genocide’. By no means being completely pro-Armenian, she collaborated with Armenian lobbyists and supported a few of their initiatives throughout her work within the US Senate. The Armenian Nationwide Committee of America now pressures Harris to vow sanctioning Azerbaijan and guaranteeing protected return of Armenians to Nagorno-Karabakh to be able to appeal to Armenian American voters. Democrats, on the whole, are extra centered on international affairs and the rising US footprint worldwide. However this assumption doesn’t essentially imply that if Kamala Harris wins the presidential election, she’s going to considerably improve the US attain within the South Caucasus. The international coverage doctrine of the Democrats shouldn’t be clear but, and it’s a query of how Kamala Harris will deal with Transcaucasia in such an advanced interval. We could count on the Democrats to proceed Biden’s trajectory and focus on the Center East, Russia-Ukraine battle and East Asia. Thus, the eye to the South Caucasus will depend on which function the rising regional order will play within the altering international safety structure. Harris’s administration will unlikely be happy with elevated Russian or Iranian management over the area. So, a containment coverage could type a central mannequin.
There’s a widespread opinion that the peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan could occur in November this 12 months in the course of the COP29 summit hosted by Baku – if the US intensifies the negotiations. Such a breakthrough is useful for each events and the US, which can get a mediator function. Nonetheless, it’s contentious whether or not such a situation is possible. It requires robust political will and express settlement on the abovementioned sticking factors. What’s extra necessary is that Azerbaijan doesn’t have to rush and make undesirable concessions – particularly bearing in mind the probabilities of Trump being re-elected and a subsequent lower in US participation in regional affairs. But when the peace deal occurs in November, it might hopefully launch a brand new period of cooperation, lasting peace and stability.
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