Colin Flint, a geographer by coaching, is Distinguished Professor within the Division of Political Science at Utah State College. His analysis pursuits embody geopolitics and peacebuilding. He’s the writer of Close to and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower (Stanford College Press, 2024), Introduction to Geopolitics (Routledge, 4th ed. 2022), Geopolitical Constructs: The Mulberry Harbours, World Battle Two, and the Making of a Militarized Transatlantic (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), and co-author, with Peter Taylor of Political Geography: World-Economic system, Nation-State and Locality Routledge, 7th version, 2018). He’s editor emeritus of the journal Geopolitics. His books have been translated into Spanish, Polish, Korean, Mandarin, Japanese and Farsi.
The place do you see probably the most thrilling analysis/debates taking place in your subject?
First, I ought to inform everybody that I’m a geographer by coaching. All three of my levels are within the self-discipline of geography. For many individuals, geography is a quiz class, an inventory of info about mountains, capital cities, and so on. How are you going to get a complicated diploma in that?! Educational geography is a theoretically based mostly social science, with some overlap with the humanities, that sees the social development of locations, territories, areas, networks, and scales as inseparable from the processes studied by political science and worldwide relations students.
I don’t imply to present a lecture, however this understanding of who I’m and what, as a geographer, I do is essential to get on the time period “subject” within the query. I’m a political geographer who’s knowledgeable by world-systems evaluation writing on the subject of the relative decline of the US as a hegemonic energy, and the rise of China as a challenger, with a concentrate on seapower. Relations between the World North and World South play an enormous position in how I strategy this subject.
Having mentioned that, I see probably the most thrilling growth in my subject as not a “what” however a “who.” The attitude on political geography, particularly world scale adjustments, was as soon as dominated by European and US voices. Actually, British and Irish students led the revival of political geography within the Nineteen Eighties, although usually based mostly in US universities. Japanese students performed a key position too. Now voices from China and the World South are enjoying an growing half in data manufacturing. As we face a interval of geopolitical competitors, it will be important that these totally different voices come collectively in dialogue. It is usually the duty of senior students and journal editors to facilitate that dialogue. Now students, akin to these in Iran, stay wedded to the theories of basic geopoliticians (akin to Mackinder). Western students can study from this concentrate on older theories, often discredited by vital geographers, with out dismissing them, whereas introducing students from the World South to new theories. Placing pre-prints on ResearchGate and in articles on websites like E-Internaional Relations will help as students within the World South wrestle for entry to journals.
When it comes to approaches within the subject, I sense a swing again to world and structural arguments that have been criticized with the emergence of post-modernism and post-structuralism and the rejection of meta-narratives. For good or unhealthy, we’re experiencing change on a worldwide scale. The worldwide needs to be seen as a system. I really feel the onus is upon political geography students who concentrate on contingency and assemblages to say how smaller scale settings match into the larger image.
Lastly, I see thrilling alternatives within the conversations between geographers, political scientists, and students in associated fields round matters of peace that require consideration of the social development of locations and scales. Most important peace students appear to “get” what educational geography is all about. I’ll broaden on that in my response to the subsequent query.
How has the way in which you perceive the world modified over time, and what (or who) prompted probably the most vital shifts in your pondering?
I used to be lucky in the way in which that my undergraduate and graduate training blended very totally different however complementary approaches. I used to be a non-traditional pupil and was trepidatious coming into the Geography program on the College of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. My eyes have been opened by the educating and scholarship of Peter J. Taylor who launched me to world-systems evaluation. He additionally gave me the braveness to pursue graduate levels and, finally, a profession in academia.
I did my Grasp’s and Ph.D. levels on the College of Colorado-Boulder with John O’Loughlin as my advisor. In a dizzying swap, I used to be quickly studying spatial statistics and making use of the methods to the electoral geography of the Nazi celebration. I realized an analytical and deductive strategy, and my capability to conduct statistical evaluation obtained me my first two jobs.
Lynn Staeheli, a pioneer of feminist geography, served on my graduate committees. She insisted I look past structural imperatives and the rigidity of statistics. Her affect allowed me to suppose throughout the self-discipline. That made me a extra rounded scholar and enabled me to tackle roles akin to journal editor and placing collectively edited volumes that included quite a lot of theoretical views. Together, I’ve retained my curiosity in “pondering large” with world and structural approaches whereas contemplating analysis design and inference, and non-deterministic classes.
All through that course of I’ve engaged the scholarship of world-systems evaluation – the inspiration of my strategy. Therefore, I’m indebted and in awe of the contribution made by Immanuel Wallerstein. I discovered Giovanni Arrighi’s work to be significantly helpful for my pondering on geopolitics, and Andre Gunder Frank’s strategy to what we name as we speak World North-World South relations. The scholarship of Christopher Chase-Dunn and Bob Denemark helped me see the advantages of mixing an analytical and historic strategy with the world-systems framework.
Extra not too long ago I’ve been invigorated by a dialogue with peace research students (geographers and non-geographers). Working with Kara E. Dempsey on an edited quantity of geography scholarship helped me interact youthful geography students. Collaboration with Annika Björkdahl, Gearoid Millar, and others has proven me how geography can contribute to cross-disciplinary debates, and the way geographers can study from others. It additionally helps me be extra optimistic: Fascinated by how peace is, and could be constructed, and divert me from my tendency to consider battle.
To what extent has China’s Belt and Highway Initiative strengthened its geopolitical affect since its launch in 2013?
The BRI is the mandatory infrastructure for China to seal its place because the world’s largest buying and selling nation. The BRI shouldn’t be considered in slim phrases – as simply roads, railways, airports, and ports. It is usually a set of agreements that tie nations into engagement with China. It’s usually seen by means of a geographic lens – the connection of nodes by means of the BRI, and the corridors that partially represent it, that unfold throughout oceans and continents. The BRI must also be seen by means of a temporal lens. World-systems evaluation identifies a hegemonic nation as one which features world dominance first in manufacturing, then commerce, then finance. The BRI performs an essential position for China, as a conduit for exports that mitigate what would in any other case be home overcapacity. The excellent query is whether or not dominance in world commerce will result in China gaining monetary dominance, with the Yuan eclipsing the US greenback because the foreign money of worldwide commerce. We’re a great distance from that and lots of doubt that may occur. But China has managed to make sure some funds are made in Yuan. Merely, watch this area…
These financial processes and connections are geopolitical. My strategy is to not divide (geo)financial and (geo)political processes. They’re twin methods in a single political-economy logic. Commentary on the BRI usually will get most animated when China builds or seems to construct, army installations in ports. Or focus is usually on army muscle and island constructing within the South China Sea. Nevertheless, these manifestations are simply the clear army ingredient of a course of through which China is looking for financial ties that allow the import of inputs and the export of completed items to construct its economic system. The result’s “pursuits” in different nations (a time period we barely think about on the subject of US “pursuits.” These “pursuits” – websites of funding and manufacturing want safety, as do the commerce routes to and from China. Therefore, the militarization of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean area.
The opposite level about “affect” shouldn’t be what however the place. Traditional geopolitics tends to concentrate on nice powers and ignore the remainder of the world. It is a mistake. The affect China has gained is, to this point, primarily within the World South. All through historical past this has been the technique to changing into a hegemon; acquire dominance within the poorer nations to entry inputs into your economic system, on the expense of rivals. For apparent causes, nice powers need to keep away from direct battle, so competitors usually takes the type of proxy conflicts in faraway locations. These conflicts usually happen to defend “pursuits” with the assistance of pleasant governments, not essentially performing in the perfect curiosity of their residents.
The BRI has enabled China in these processes, and the development appears to be of their favor. However, many BRI initiatives stay incomplete and even seemingly deserted. There is no such thing as a fait accompli, however the BRI has given China the aggressive edge.
What key components have led to better financial and political cooperation amongst nations within the World South lately?
I discover this second of Chinese language cooperation with the World South very attention-grabbing. I’m tempted to say that it’s outdated wine in new bottles, however that’s not fairly the entire story. First, let’s look behind the rhetoric. China is establishing World North-World South relations which have remained broadly constant because the finish of formal imperialism. These are the relations described throughout the concepts of dependence between metropoles and periphery. Funding and the creation of debt circumstances are half and parcel of those relations. That’s why the wails of indignation from Western nations about Chinese language created “debt traps” must be approached with cynicism: These relationships (managed by the IMF and World Financial institution) have been a dominant and chronic characteristic of the post-Second World Battle. Deborah Brautigam and her crew have finished a superb job of documenting Chinese language loans and offering proof to counter geopolitical representations that counsel China is doing one thing distinctive, fairly than establishing relations modeled on earlier connections.
The identical could be mentioned of commerce relations. The constant mannequin of unequal alternate stays. The variations are two-fold. It’s now China that’s the dominant buying and selling associate, and sustainable power and super-computing/AI know-how have made the mining of and commerce in new tremendous vital minerals the brand new frontier of commerce. Totally different stuff, similar unequal relations.
Second, is what might be totally different in China’s relations with the World South, and for that, we should always take into consideration the actions and issues of the nations of the World South – or why do many appear keen to construct relations with China? The reason being that the Rostowian mannequin of developmentalism has failed. It has not failed within the minds of the UN or IMF and continues to be hailed faithfully in publications like The Economist. However the concept pursuing “the correct insurance policies” imposed upon World South nations by World North nations will result in development in nationwide wealth rings hole for a lot of the world. The messages of connections which can be “mutually helpful”, “South-South cooperation” and “win-win relations” sound like a promising reset, although rhetoric that may be simply uncovered. For nations of the World South, why not attempt to interact these new concepts, particularly after they’re related to funding in infrastructure? And let’s not overlook, China’s technique of not worrying a few regime’s human rights document and never preaching the advantages of “democratization.”
Therefore, it’s a fascinating second through which the Rostowian ideology of World North-World South relations appears to be on its final legs, a brand new rhetoric has appeared, however the relations that preserve World North-World South relations are more likely to proceed. The tensions that come up from persistent inequality counsel that China will probably be pressured to steadily improve its army presence within the World South to “police” its “pursuits” simply because the US did post-Second World Battle, and the British earlier than them.
Are ports regaining their strategic significance in geopolitics, or have they by no means misplaced their standing as vital geopolitical belongings?
They’ve at all times been essential however come to the fore at durations of geopolitical transition. The flexibility to manage ports throughout the globe allows commerce throughout oceans and attain into continental hinterlands. I grew up in Dover within the southeast of England. On the time (the Seventies) it was, I consider, the busiest passenger ferry port on the planet. Some school rooms in my faculty supplied a pleasant view of the ferries coming and going, a prepared distraction. Dover was a key port for the Romans, and ruins of a Roman lighthouse stay. Dover was one of many Cinque ports of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a community of ports in southern England with particular duty for the defence of England. It was a key port within the Napoleonic period wars, and French prisoners of warfare have been housed in tunnels dug into the chalk cliffs; their graffiti can nonetheless be seen. Essential additionally on the planet wars, the place bunkers within the cliffs (utilizing the Napeonic period tunnels) have been used because the command management submit for the Dunkirk evacuation. Although the relative significance of Dover as a port has now waned, the instance reveals {that a} port is more likely to retain its significance over the centuries.
Why? As a result of ports allow defence of dwelling waters, and the power to challenge energy over the horizon, and even throughout the globe. Controlling ports in different nations by means of funding and administration offers allows a rustic to increase these port capabilities into extraterritorial places, or ports in different nations. The flexibility to manage ports throughout the globe is what Hassan Noorali and I’ve referred to as “Port Energy.” As with most issues geopolitical, there’s little consideration to such phenomena in a interval of stability, or a geopolitical world order. It’s when issues change that we take discover. And that’s taking place as we speak with China’s growth of the BRI requiring the institution of a community of ports; some primarily financial in operate (akin to Piraeus in Greece) and others with clear army intention akin to (Ream in Cambodia). The essential operate of ports stays fixed, however they’re at present focal factors of strategic competitors.
Why ought to we concentrate on the geopolitics of sea energy as we speak?
As a result of comparable contexts of competitors between sea powers have led to world warfare. In my e book Close to and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower I hint the historical past of Dutch seapower in (roughly) the 1600s, British seapower within the 1800s, and US seapower within the 1900s to the current. The aim is to know the up to date context of, seemingly, declining US and rising Chinese language seapower. The geopolitical course of is one through which a rustic that controls its close to waters (these near its coast) is ready to challenge energy into far waters (the close to waters of different nations) for financial and strategic acquire.
After all, historical past doesn’t give us easy or completely transferable comparisons. And there are some optimistic takeaways, notably the switch of British to US seapower with out the 2 combating one another. But this switch occurred over the span of two world wars as British seapower was challenged by Japan and Germany. The lack of British seapower occurred because it was concurrently challenged in its Asian far waters by Japan and coastal close to waters by Germany. The up to date context is one through which China is difficult solely in US far waters. Nevertheless, that was the scenario that the Dutch confronted, and far of the Thirty Years Battle was fought of their far waters.
There’s a second cause to contemplate the geopolitics of seapower, and that’s the must rethink geopolitics itself. Seapower is a matter of worldwide attain, particularly into the far waters of the World South, to nurture and shield financial “pursuits.” The definition of geopolitics turns into a political economic system query with World North and World South relations at its core. That is in distinction to the Nice Energy competitors bias of basic geopolitics that may concentrate on dyadic political interactions.
How has the rise of China within the twenty first century rekindled the controversy about sea energy in up to date geopolitics?
The work of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan has develop into re-animated: it’s the Frankensteinization of the US’s basic geopolitician. Mahan wrote his basic textual content The Affect of Sea Energy upon Historical past (1890). It was a name for the US to maneuver from the politics of state constructing within the North American continent to develop into a seapower and search world energy. The argument was backed up later, in additional educational and fewer strident tones, by the tutorial geographer Isaiah Bowman in his nationally hubristically titled textbook The New World (1922).
The distinction this time is that Mahan wrote for an offensive technique, the growth of US seapower, with out frightening a warfare with the British. Now, the reference to Mahan is defensive. It’s involved with how China is adopting a Mahanesque technique and creating its personal seapower. The bias of basic geopolitics is uncovered. What was good for the goose is outwardly unacceptable for the gander. Or, our seapower good, their seapower unhealthy. It’s a second through which we have to problem all basic geopolitical assumptions. They aren’t goal historically-informed theories that will have relevance to “our” nation. As an alternative, they’re thinly veiled coverage suggestions hiding below a veneer of scholarly arguments. They’re appropriate for justifying insurance policies, however in a method that may most definitely result in warfare.
As an alternative, I suggest a geopolitics that understands the world as an built-in system. World North-World South relations are key, as is knowing how and why World North nations compete towards one another to outline and dominate in far waters of the World South. I consider that such a framework that encourages us to see the system as an entire, allows us to take the duty of attempting to keep away from one other spherical of worldwide warfare.
Wanting previous China’s rising affect within the South China Sea, do you anticipate to see further related rising gamers clashing towards one another over maritime territories within the coming years? If that’s the case, what impact might this have?
Sure, let me offer you three examples and one non-example. First, the non-example. Opposite to the challenges confronted by the Dutch and the British within the last years of their period of seapower, the US is unlikely to face a problem in its close to waters. The japanese and western seaboard of the US is not going to come below risk from a hostile nation as have been, for instance, the English Channel and the North Sea shoreline for the British when dealing with the problem of Germany. It’s attainable that the seas across the Aleutian Islands will face elevated Chinese language and Russian naval presence, and China might mine the seabed southeast of Hawaii, however this presence wouldn’t have an effect on the key ports of the US. The place there’s emergence, already ongoing, is in three arenas: the Pink Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Arctic Ocean, and the Black Sea.
The Pink Sea and the Persian Gulf have been US far waters because it changed Britain in that position by means of its position, with the British, in a 1953 coup that established the monarchical rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, and have become the dominant energy after the Suez Disaster of 1956. However this presence is now not taken with no consideration. Iran and its help for the Houthis in Yemen have led to a scenario through which a non-state actor is the instant bodily risk to transport. China is enjoying a protracted sport within the area. The mixed affect is the present disruption of the oil commerce, and the rising strategic capability of China to allow the circulate of the oil that it relies upon upon. Iran’s affect is more likely to improve in that state of affairs, with implications for the safety of Israel. The method additionally reveals the position of non-state actors (although with vital state help) within the capability to disrupt sea visitors in sea strains of communication near shorelines.
The Arctic is already a area of competitors, and that’s more likely to improve as world local weather change makes sea routes by means of the North Pole area extra possible. Claims to the ocean mattress, notably by Russia, are a part of this dynamic. The implication is larger Chinese language and Russian naval presence within the area (generally cooperatively) and the necessity for NATO to focus its naval presence within the Arctic Ocean and North Atlantic, and preserve the militarization of the Greenland-Iceland-UK hole. It’s a return to Chilly Battle eventualities.
The Black Sea is of curiosity for 2 causes. First, no matter occurs on land within the Russia-Ukraine warfare, Russia has already encountered a strategic defeat. It now not has management of its Black Sea and Sea of Azov close to waters. It can not challenge uncontested energy in that sea, and threaten its neighbors. It can not disrupt the commerce of its adversaries. And it’s liable to being unable to guard its shoreline and the seized Crimean peninsula. Second, the technique of Russia’s lack of management of its close to waters is noteworthy. Ukraine, not a acknowledged seapower, has ushered Russia out of the area with modern drone weaponry. It reveals that any nation (and lots of non-state actors) can develop and use such know-how. The implication is that non-state actors within the Pink Sea and the Persian Gulf will extra readily disrupt ocean visitors.
What’s an important recommendation you possibly can give to younger students of Worldwide Relations?
Be eclectic in the way in which you develop your framework for understanding the world, after which keep it up. Don’t be fadish. However don’t be conceited or defensive about your strategy. Acknowledge that every one explanations are partial and which you could (and possibly ought to) tune up your personal strategy all through your profession. Use convention panels and fora in journals to have conversations round a subject from differrent views. The intention must be to acknowledge the worth of partaking numerous views, and the humility to know that every one social science explanations are partial. Hopefully, your efforts will result in extra individuals in your subject recognizing the fondness of their very own views!
Additional Studying on E-Worldwide Relations
